views on the sanctity of life and the enormous costs (physical, spiritual, economic, etc) sometimes associated with an adherence to those views. They had to ask themselves whether life was so sacred as to justify the use of any means whatsoever in its preservation. The Church's response was the now famous Papal pronouncement in 1957 in which Pius XII declared that 'Normally one is held to use only ordinary means . . . that is to say, means that do not involve any grave burden for oneself or others ' (1) . Defining what would represent a 'grave burden' has occupied the time and attention ofmany a philosopher/ ethicist. Such is not, however, my purpose in this paper. Instead, it is my claim that the ordinary/ extraordinary distinction is only ofmoral import if one adheres to a sanctity of life position; a position I, without argument, will reject (2). That is, if the value is not assigned to the preservation of life, but instead is assigned to the goods that life acts as a means to (for example interrelational ability, self-awareness, moral existence, etc), then the need for the moral 'excuse' the concept of extraordinary care provides will disappear.
The predominant concern with the use of the distinction has been to provide a justification for overriding what was perceived as a near absolute obligation -to preserve life. If ' (8) . The second group includes those babies for whom, while death is not imminent, current treatment methods will provide no benefit. 'If the operation were performed it is likely that healing would not occur, that there would be wound breakdown, and that infection could be far worse than if no operation were done at all. In these cases the baby would be given simply dressing' (9).
In both of these cases the medical indication for nontreatment is a crucial consideration. However, by reducing the total decision to this element Ramsey has oversimplified the role of the physician to that of a mere technician. An appropriate treatment plan in either of the cited cases would need to appeal to other physician duties.
While it is not applicable in those cases, another obvious duty is to consider the patient's wishes. Ramsey goes to great lengths, in his response to Robert Veatch, to argue that the right to refuse treatment (and hence the corresponding duty to respect that refusal) is merely 'relative'. A patient's 'freedom and dignity do not encompass the right to do wrong, a right to assault the value of his own life with or without medical assistance' (10). While I agree that Veatch's position denies room for physician conscience, Ramsey's goes too far the other way. Individuals do have the right to 'assault the value of their own lives', so long as in the process they do not cause excessive harm to others. However, individuals do not have the right to demand that another (ie a physician) carries out that 'assault'. A physician may, in many circumstances, refuse further association with a patient with whom he or she has a moral conflict. However, any appropriate treatment plan must consider, and most often respect, the competent patient's wishes, regardless ofwhether they are consistent with medical indications.
A third duty is to attempt to improve the quality of the patient's life. Included in this is the obligation to 'do no harm,' so long as it is understood that it oftentimes may be necessary to incur some harm (most frequently, causing pain) so as to bring about a higher good of improving the quality of life. While I do not have the space either to list or analyse those elements that lead to such an improvement, it is important to note that prolongation of life is not necessarily included. It is easy to imagine conditions (for example prolonged intractable pain, near total loss of dignity, etc) wherein continued existence represents a harm. Hence, as I noted at the outset, the physician only has a duty to preserve life if it can serve as a means to a higher good.
A fourth duty is to consider the family's wishes, and to a lesser degree, to attempt to understand and work with the social interaction ofthat family, at least insofar as that interaction pertains to the effective treatment of the primary patient. While I recognise that the majority of physicians reject the family-practice model of the family as a whole being the patient, few would deny that family interaction is frequently a critical element of patient care. The most obvious examples are like the previously cited cases provided by Ramsey (2). His focus in the discussion of the cases is on the patient's potential quality of life and, in fact, he does not even consider the impact of the child on its family's life, nor does he discuss the parents' rights to be involved in the decision-making process. Both exclusions represent a gross oversimplification of the wide range of important family oriented elements involved in such a decision.
Less obvious, but equally important examples are those in which the entire family's life-style will be altered so as to accommodate the ill patient; for example dietary changes (hypertensives, diabetics), reductions in activity (cardiac patients), adherence to strict medication schedules, etc. While I do not feel the family's responses to these problems should necessarily be respected as ultimately authoritative, the physician does have an obligation to take them into consideration when determining appropriate treatment.
A fifth duty is to consider what cost will be incurred in society (including for example the psychological/ emotional costs to the health care team) as a result of a given treatment. What is the economic source of the treatment? How will the treatment, or lack thereof, affect the morale (and hence other patient care) of the team? How, in extreme cases, will treatment, or lack thereof, affect public perception of the institution? Though these considerations should and do carry less weight in the decision-making process, determinations of appropriate treatment should include them.
A sixth and final duty is to avoid litigation. The impact of a lengthy and costly court trial on other patient care and on overall medical costs, combined with possible financial or criminal retribution for the physician, make this last duty of utmost concern. While it can be forcibly argued that this consideration should be ultimately authoritative when those harms represent a significant threat, it must also be recognised that physicians will, not infrequently, find their medical and moral obligations in conflict with their legal obligations. In such situations the physician will be faced with a difficult decision as to which option represents the greatest harm.
One might object that the task I have presented to the physician is too overwhelming. If 
